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NATIONAL IRISH BANK v RTE AND FINDING
THE BALANCE: BREACH OF CONFIDENCE,
PRIVACY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST TEST IN
ENGLAND AND IRELAND
Helen Fenwick, Professor of Law and Gavin Phillipson, Lecturer in
Law, Human Rights Centre, University of Durham.'
INTRODUCTION
It is now well known that the primary vehicle since the Human Rights Act
1998 for providing greater protection in England against invasion of the
privacy by the media has been breach of confidence.2 The doctrine of
confidence, which had been used for some time in English law to deal with
situations concerning the unauthorised use of commercial information, state
secrets3 and personal data,4 is now becoming, under the impetus of the Human
Rights Act (hereafter HRA), something close to a fully-fledged privacy law. No
such development is apparent so far in Ireland. However, the introduction into
Irish law of Article 8 (the right to respect for private life) of the European
Convention on Human Rights via the European Convention on Human
Rights Act 2003 (hereafter ECHRA) may also provide the impetus, as in
England, for the development of breach of confidence into a defacto privacy
remedy.
It is possible that the right to privacy, as one of the un-enumerated rights
under Article 40.3.1 of the Irish Constitution, might be relied upon instead,
rendering such a development unnecessary.5 This might have been expected
to be the case already, bearing in mind its direct horizontal effect. However,
this is not a development that has occurred so far (although Article 8 under
1 A draft of this paper was originally delivered at a Symposium on Freedom of
Expression, 5-6 December 2003, held at Trinity College, Dublin.
2 See Venables and another v News Group Newspapers [2001] 1 All ER 908;
Douglas and Zeta-Jones v Hello! [2001] QB 967, at 997 (CA) (application for
interim injunction to restrain surreptitiously taken photographs of a celebrity
wedding); Douglas and Zeta-Jones v Hello! [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch) (final trial,
hereafter, "Douglas I)"; A v B plc [2002] 3 WLR 542 (CA) (concerned with
whether an injunction should be granted to restrain publication of details of
premiership footballer's affair with a lap-dancer); Campbell v MGN [2003] 2 WLR
80 (CA) (action to restrain publication of details of the model's treatment at
Narcotics Anonymous, including photographs of her outside the clinic); Theakston
v MGN [2002] EMLR 22 (application to restrain detailed description and
photographs of the TV presenter's visit to a brothel given to the Sunday People by
a prostitute); Mills v News Groups Newspapers (injunction preventing publication
of the applicant's address in The Sun refused); see eg R. Singh and T. Strachan,
"The Right to Privacy in English Law" [20021 EHRLR 129; G. Phillipson,
"Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a common law right of privacy
under the Human Rights Act" [2003] 66(5)MLR 726.
4 A-G v Guardian Newspapers [1987] 3 All ER 316.
5 Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449; 2 All ER 477; 2 WLR 1280.
5 SeeMvDrury [1994]2 IR 8.
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the ECHRA might provide the guidelines for such a development) and
therefore courts and potential litigants may prefer to rely on the doctrine of
confidence, interpreted in line with Article 8 ECHR and the established
English post-HRA case-law discussed in this article on confidence as a
privacy remedy. In support of this point it may be noted that in McDonnell v
Ireland' Barrington J said: "If the general law provides an adequate cause of
action to vindicate a constitutional right it appears to me that the injured
party cannot ask the court to devise a new and different cause of action."
Arguably, the doctrine of confidence - if developed along the lines argued
for in this article - already provides the means of vindicating the implied
right of privacy under the Constitution at least in cases of unauthorised
publication of personal information. In that context, the development of the
public interest defence to the breach of confidence action in Irish law, as
illustrated by the decision of the Supreme Court in National Irish Bank v RTE7
(hereafter NIB v RTE), is particularly significant. This decision has received
remarkably little academic attention and is surely now due for re-evaluation,
given the further developments that may be expected in the public interest
defence following the introduction of Article 10 of the Convention (the right
to freedom of expression) into Irish law.8 This paper is concerned primarily
with the extent to which the Irish doctrine of confidence is ripe for
development into a privacy law, and, in particular, the implications for the
public interest defence of such a development.
It is necessary to begin, therefore, by examining the elements of breach of
confidence, as interpreted by the Irish courts, in particular in the NIB v RTE
case, and to compare the Irish approach with the more flexible one adopted
by English courts, both before and after the HRA.
THE ELEMENTS OF BREACH OF CONFIDENCE
The Development Of The English Doctrine
The House of Lords in Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2)9
found that the ruling in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Limited ° conveniently
summarised the three traditionally accepted key elements of the law of
confidence:
"First the information itself . . . must have the necessary
quality of confidence about it. Secondly, that information must
have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation
of confidence. Thirdly, there must be an unauthorised use of
6 [1998] 1 IR 141.
7 [1998]2 IR 465.
8 See n 68 below for one of the few commentaries on MB v RTE. The Irish
Constitution, both explicitly in Art 40.6.1 and as one of the un-enumerated rights in
Art 40.3.1, provides for a right to freedom of expression. In this paper, however,
we concentrate upon the possible impact of Art 10 ECHR; O'Dell comments that
Art 40.6.1 "has failed to develop any meaningful protection for speech" (Eoin
O'Dell, "When two tribes go to war: Privacy Interests and Free Speech" in Law
and the Media: Views of Journalists and Lawyers (Dublin: Sweet and Maxwell,
1997), at 241).
9 [1990] 1 AC 109.It [1969] RPC 41, at 47.
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that information to the detriment of the party communicating
it."
For our purposes it is the second element that is of greatest interest, since it is
in that element that the most radical developments have occurred in the
English courts. Traditionally, this requirement founded liability on the basis
that if information was accepted on the understanding that it would be kept
secret, the recipient's conscience would be bound by that undertaking, and it
would be unconscionable for him to break his duty of confidence by
publishing the information to others." It is accepted in both English and
Irish courts that this second element will be present in the following
situations: first, where a pre-existing relationship of trust and confidence
exists between plaintiff and defendant; 12 second, where there has been an
express agreement of confidentiality between the parties or promise to that
effect by the defendant; 3 and third, where the defendant is a third party to
such a relationship but has acquired confidential information communicated
between the parties to that relationship. English law has recognised a fourth
category of cases: those in which the confidential information in question is
surreptitiously taken or acquired by the defendant. Each category
successively widens the ambit of the action. The difference between the first
three categories and the fourth is that in relation to the first three there must
be a relationship of fidelity or express agreement of confidentiality; in the
fourth, neither of these elements is needed; the defendant may indeed be a
stranger to the plaintiff.
This fourth category does not appear to have been clearly recognised in
Ireland although there are many pre-HRA English cases on surreptitious
takings of information. As early as 1913, it was said:
"The principle upon which the Court of Chancery has acted for
many years has been to restrain the publication of confidential
information surreptitiously obtained or of information
imparted in confidence which ought not to be divulged."' 4
There have been numerous cases since illustrating that an obligation of
confidence may be imposed in such circumstances,' as well as dicta to this
effect at the highest level.' 6 Thus English decisions moved the doctrine to the
1 As stated, for example, in Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449.
12 See eg Wv Edgell [19901 Ch 59 (doctor-patient); X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 650 and
Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers [1987] 1 WLR 1248 (both employer-
employee).
1' Law Commission, Breach of Confidence (Law Corn No 110), at par 6.11.
"' Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch419.
15 See eg Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers [1984] 1 WLR 892 (information
obtained through the use of an unlawful telephone tap); Shelley Films v Rex
Features Limited [1994] EMLR 134 (injunction granted to prevent the use of a
photograph taken surreptitiously on the film set of Frankenstein); Creation
Records Ltd v News Groups Newspapers Ltd [1997] EMLR 444 (injunction
granted to prevent publication of a photograph of an album cover design taken
surreptitiously on the set).
16 Lord Goff suggested in A-G v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, at
281, that an obligation could be imposed where ". . . an obviously confidential
document is wafted by an electric fan out of the window into a crowded street, or
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point at which the obligation of confidence could be imposed unilaterally; it was
no longer founded on the express or implied agreement of the parties that the
communication would be confidential. This approach had in fact already been
indicated in Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Limited: it was said that the
obligation would be imposed if ". . . the circumstances are such that any
reasonable man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would
have realised that upon reasonable grounds the information was given to him in
confidence. .. "'" The test appears to be wholly objective - actual appreciation
by the defendant that an obligation has been imposed seems to be unnecessary.
These developments, as the authors argued before the HRA came into force,'"
rendered the doctrine useable as "a privacy law in all but name.' 9 If all that was
necessary to impose an obligation of confidentiality was the application of a
reasonable man test, then not only did any need for pre-existing relationships or
express agreements of confidentiality fall away: in addition, there needed to be
nothing recognisable as a "communication" from the plaintiff to any other
person for the duty to arise. Therefore the doctrine offered the potential to be
used against journalists seeking to publish material obtained surreptitiously
from the defendant through, for example, photography using long-range lenses,
or bugging devices, since in such cases it would be possible for the plaintiff to
argue that, where the information obtained was clearly private in character, a
reasonable man would have understood that s/he was obliged to treat it as
confidential." This, we suggest, could come about entirely as a result of the
nature of the information in question, coupled sometimes with the fact that the
defendant had to resort to surreptitious means to acquire it. Post-HRA cases
have clearly confirmed this development. Thus in A v B plc the Court of
Appeal observed:
"The need for the existence of a confidential relationship
should not give rise to problems as to the law ... A duty of
confidence will arise whenever the party subject to the duty is
in a situation where he either knows or ought to know that the
other person can reasonably expect his privacy to be
protected."'"
There are a number of cases under the HRA in which a prima facie
obligation has been imposed upon journalists obtaining personal information
surreptitiously in this way.22 The key point for present purposes is that the
when an obviously confidential document ... is dropped in a public place and is
then picked up by a passer-by... "
7n 10 above, at48.
18 See G. PhiUipson and H. Fenwick, "Confidence and Privacy: a Re-examination"
[1996] 55 CL 447; "Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human
Rights Act Era" [2000] 63(5)MLR 660.
'0 Ibid (MLR), at 693.
20 Problems remain over the issue of information that is arguably "private" in
character but which can only with difficulty be characterized as "confidential,"
because, for example, it consists of a photograph taken of the plaintiff in a public
place such as a park, beach or restaurant On this, however, see now Peck v UK
(2003) 36 EHRR 41 and the analysis thereof in Phillipson, n 2 above, at 738-740.
22 n 2 above, at 551B (emphasis added).
22 These include Theakston (n 2 above) in relation to the photographs surreptitiously
taken of Theakston in the brothel; Venables and Thompson (n 2 above) (since the
injunctions applied regardless of how the information - as to the identity and
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foundations for this radical development were laid, as noted above, long
before the HRA: they relied upon replacing the notion of a relationship or
agreement of confidentiality (whether express or implied) as the necessary
element in imposing an obligation of confidentiality, with the notion of the
imposition of such an obligation through an objective "reasonable man" test.
Cases since the HRA have simply structured the "reasonable man" test by
reference to the notion of a reasonable expectation of privacy, arising
because of the nature of the information and the circumstances in which it
was obtained. It is also, of course, the case that developing confidence in
this way allows much more comprehensive protection to be given to trade
secrets and the like than would have been the case if the restrictive
conditions traditionally surrounding the doctrine had continued to be strictly
enforced: indeed, one of the main sources of impetus behind the English
development of the doctrine was the very injustice that would have arisen if a
defendant who surreptitiously and unconscionably obtained clearly
confidential information and then used it for his own benefit could have
escaped liability for breach of confidence simply because of the absence of a
pre-existing relationship with the plaintiff or a promise of confidentiality. As
Browne-Wilkinson VC observed in English and American Insurance Co Ltd
v Herbert Smith:
"If somebody is handed a letter [addressed] to another marked
"Private and Confidential", that letter having been handed to
him in error, and he chooses to read it notwithstanding that it is
marked "Private and Confidential" and as a result acquires the
information contained in the letter, I find it difficult to say that
he is not implicated in the leakage of confidential information
so contained in the letter."23
Many of the older general formulations of the doctrine are not in fact
prescriptive as to the circumstances needed to impose an obligation of
confidentiality. As Lord Greene MR put it in Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v
Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd:
"If a defendant is proved to have used confidential
information, directly or indirectly obtained from a plaintiff,
without the consent, express or implied of the plaintiff, he will
be guilty of an infringement of the plaintiff's rights."24
It may be noted that this formulation simply omits the second limb of breach
of confidence set out in Coco Engineering, implying perhaps that, whilst the
Coco formulation is generally seen as authoritative, it is not to be compared
to a statutory definition: the common law retains its inherent flexibility and
formulations such as that in Saltman indicate that the second limb - at least
as traditionally understood - is by no means sacrosanct.
whereabouts of the boys - was obtained in principle) and Campbell, (n 2 above) in
which it was accepted that an obligation could in principle be imposed in relation
to photographs surreptitiously taken of Campbell outside Narcotics Anonymous
although the action failed on other grounds. For discussion, see Phillipson, n 2
above, at 744-748.[1988] FSR 232, at 238.
24 [1963]3AllER413.
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Breach of Confidence in Irish Courts
Such broad formulations of the doctrine are not, indeed, confined to English
authorities, and nor was there any particular reason why they should be,
given the heavy dependence of Irish law in this area on English case-law.
For example, Lavery, in a leading work on breach of confidence in Ireland,
summarises the position thus:
"any situation that involves the misappropriation of
information by a person, in circumstances where that person
either knows or ought to know that the information should be
kept confidential, will be caught by the action.25
Keane, similarly, took the view, in a leading Irish work on Equity and Trusts
published in 1998, that the action covered surreptitious takings of
confidential information.26
When we turn to the leading Irish Supreme Court authorities, however, we
see, in the main, only quite narrow and restrictive formulations of the
doctrine of confidence. House of Spring Gardens v Point Blank 7 concerned
a situation in which relations between parties to an agreement to develop and
market a bullet-proof vest had broken down, and the defendants subsequently
exploited the plaintiff's ideas for their own financial gain. The
circumstances were not therefore such as to induce the court to break new
ground on the question of the circumstances needed to impose the obligation
of confidentiality, since there was clearly both an existing relationship
between the parties and a promise (express or implied) of confidentiality.
But the formulations of the court contain no dicta suggesting sympathy with
a more flexible view of the doctrine. Whilst O'Higgins CJ did describe the
quote from Saltman28 as "stat[ing] the law in one succinct sentence,"29 he
went on expressly to approve" the approach of Costello J, who stated: "It
must firstly be decided whether there exists from the relationship between
the parties an obligation of confidence."'" This suggests not only the need for
circumstances imposing such an obligation, but suggests that those
circumstances can only be present where there is "a relationship between the
parties," a highly restrictive view of the action.
In NIB v RTE, the facts fell within. our third category above, where the
defendant acquires information communicated in a relationship of
confidence between the plaintiff and another. The plaintiffs operated an
investment scheme that appeared to facilitate tax evasion. In excess of 150
customers of the plaintiffs accepted an invitation to participate in the scheme.
RTE obtained information about the scheme and about the customers from
25 P. Lavery, Commercial Secrets: The Action for Breach of Confidence in Ireland
(Round Hall, 1996), at 109.26 Equity and the Law of Trusts in the Republic of Ireland (1988) at 349, para 30.05;
cited in O'Dell, n 8 above, at 204.
27 [1984] IR611.
28 That breach of confidence would be made out where "A defendant is proved to
have used confidential information, directly or indirectly obtained from a plaintiff,
without... consent..." (Saltman, n 24 above).29 n 7 above, at 695.
30 Ibid, at 696.
31 Ibid, at 663 (emphasis added).
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various sources, including, apparently, certain customers and employees of
NIB, which it wished to broadcast. The plaintiffs did not claim to be entitled
to an injunction restraining the defendant from broadcasting allegations
against them that they had been operating a scheme facilitating tax evasion.
They sought an injunction preventing the disclosure (including transmission
to the world at large) of the names of their customers and the details of their
accounts and transactions entered into by them. They claimed that that
would constitute a breach of the confidential relationship between the
plaintiffs and their customers that would cause them irreparable damage.
The defendant accepted that the dissemination of the information would
amount to a breach of the confidential relationship in question, but it argued
that the breach would be justified by the overriding requirements of the
public interest: it submitted that the evidence adduced by it to the High Court
provided a strongly arguable case for holding that the public interest in the
investigation and exposure of wrongdoing outweighed the requirements of
confidentiality. The Supreme Court found that the information concerned a
matter of serious public interest due to the wrong-doing revealed and that the
interest in publication therefore outweighed the interest in confidentiality.
By a 3:2 majority the Court found that the information should be revealed to
the public at large.
NIB v RTE thus adds little to the current understanding in Ireland of the
elements of breach of confidence, and in particular of the scope of the duty
of confidence, since both sides accepted that the material in question was
confidential and that an obligation of confidentiality existed (the information
acquired had been communicated between two parties in a relationship of
fidelity - that between a bank and its customers). Consequently, Lynch J for
the majority did not find it necessary to consider the circumstances in which
an obligation of confidence may be imposed in general. He simply observed:
"There is no doubt but that there exists a duty and a right of
confidentiality between banker and customer as also exists in
many other relationships such as for example doctor and
patient and lawyer and client. This duty of confidentiality
extends to third parties into whose hands confidential
information may come and such third parties can be injuncted
to prohibit the disclosure of such confidential information."32
These two decisions, therefore, do nothing to confirm that the developments
that have taken place in English law, facilitating the use of confidence as a
privacy remedy, will take root in Ireland. As we have seen, the facts
provided no opportunity to do so; however, the formulations accepted in
House of Spring Gardens in particular are very conservative. Nevertheless,
they do not wholly rule out the possibility of such developments in the
future. The courts could be viewed in both instances as merely preferring to
decide no more than they had to on the basis of the facts before them.
Breach Of Confidence As A Privacy Remedy In Irish Courts?
Of course, there are noteworthy arguments against the use of breach of
confidence as a privacy remedy, in particular the artificiality of the reasoning
32 n 7 above, at 494.
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that must be employed and the fact that such use distorts an action originally
developed to uphold the confidentiality of certain socially or professionally
important relationships and to allow those who have expended labour, time
and skill the exclusive right to exploit commercially valuable information
obtained thereby.33 There are also, of course, crucial differences between the
concepts of "confidential" (essentially meaning inaccessible) information
and information relating to private life. These issues are already causing
difficulties for the English courts.34 It is not the purpose of this paper to seek
to refute these arguments or even to suggest partial solutions to them.35 Its
much more limited purpose is merely to point out, in pragmatic vein, that
flawed as breach of confidence is as a tool for protecting privacy, the reality
is that Ireland, like England, has no tort of invasion of privacy. The likely
consequence is therefore that the courts will find themselves urged by
litigants to develop breach of confidence so as to provide greater protection
for privacy since the ECHRA has introduced Article 8 (as an interpretive
principle) into Irish law. Whilst, as indicated in the introduction, it is
possible that the implied constitutional right to privacy may provide
protection against un-authorised use of personal information in some
circumstances, in particular in relation to interception of private
communications,36 it has not been developed so far to provide comprehensive
protection against intrusive publications in the media. There is, however, a
reasonably persuasive case to be made out that Strasbourg case-law and the
general principles it has developed under Article 8 do suggest the need for
such a remedy.37 Now that the ECHRA is in force therefore, it is quite
possible that Irish courts, like their English counterparts, and influenced
perhaps by the English case law under the HRA referred to above, will start
to develop breach of confidence to fill this lacuna. If this indeed occurs, the
focus will be thrown much more sharply than hitherto upon the public
interest defence. Before turning to explore this matter, however, it is worth
33 See O'Dell, n 8 above, at 213: "In summary... the essence of the action of breach
of confidence is that it allows the commercial exploitation of information; and, as
an incident, may keep information secret. Though there have been extensions (for
example to cover domestic or Government confidences) they have been just that,
extensions; they do not define the essence of the action, rather the commercial
essence of the action conditions these extension." See also ibid, at 211-18.
34 See n 20 above and, generally, Phillipson, n 2 above.
35 It may be argued, however, that the basis of the action for confidence and that of
privacy are perhaps not quite so far apart conceptually as O'Dell suggests. O'Dell
(n 8 above) accepts, as the best available, Westin's definition of privacy: "the
claims of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when,
now and to what extent information about them is communicated to others" (from
Privacy and Freedom (New York: Athenaeum, 1967); if this is accepted, then
privacy and confidence have a common conceptual basis: both found upon the
basic principle of control over information, whether that information is sensitive
because personal, or because commercially valuable.
36 Kennedy v Ireland [1987] IR 687 held that an un-authorised telephone tap "was a
deliberate, conscious and unjustifiable breach of the applicant's right to privacy"
as an implied right under the Irish Constitution (O'Dell, note 8 above, at 229); see
also Desmond v Glackin (No 2) [1993] IR 67, at 98, in which Hanlon J referred to
a "right to privacy in communications." See also text to n 5 and 6.
7 See Fenwick and Phillipson, n 18 above (MLR), at 664-667. The main decision
indicating this is the Commission's admissibility decision in Earl Spencer v
United Kingdom (1998) 25 EHRR CD 105.
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taking a closer look at the ECHRA, in order to determine just how much
influence the Convention is likely to have post - "incorporation".
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
2003: A LIMITED INSTRUMENT?
The main issue with which this paper is concerned is the impact of the
ECHRA upon the action for confidence. The ECHRA will clearly affect the
common law,38 but it should be noted that it appears to impose significantly
weaker obligations upon Irish courts to change the common law than does
the HRA in the UK context. Section 2(1) enjoins Irish courts that when
"interpreting and applying any statutory provision or rule of law" they should
do so, "so far as is possible ... in a manner compatible with the state's
obligations under the Convention provisions." This is a very similar
provision to section 3(1) HRA. 3' However, there are two critical differences
between the two Acts concerning the courts' duties in relation to the
common law. Whilst the ECHRA does at least clarify that the "rules of law"
that the courts must interpret compatibly with the Convention if possible
include "common law",4" the provision in section 5 for making a declaration
of incompatibility if the court finds that a given law is incompatible with the
Convention, applies not only to statutes (as with the HRA) but also the
common law.4 In contrast, the judges' duty in section 6(1) HRA to act
compatibly with the Convention - something which it now seems reasonably
certain includes their function in developing and applying the common law
42
- is limited only by incompatible primary legislation43 not by incompatible
common law rules. Therefore an Irish judge, it appears, is required only to
seek to develop the common law compatibly with the Convention; if she
finds that she cannot, she can only issue a declaration of incompatibility. In
contrast, an English judge appears - although this is not yet free from doubt 4
38 An immediate issue arises as to whether the phrase "common law" used in the Act
will actually include breach of confidence. Many scholars and judges would still
view it as an equitable doctrine, although it may be noted that Shanley J referred to
it in NIB v RTE as "the tort of breach of confidence" (at 474). However it is
possible that rules of equity are covered by the Act: the ECHRA uses the phrase
"rule of law"; this is explicitly stated to include the common law in s 1(1) but may
be read to include equitable actions also. There would seem to be no sensible
reason to exclude them.
39 s 3(1) HRA reads: "So far as is possible to do so, primary and secondary
legislation must be read and given effect in a way that is compatible with the
Convention rights". This of course is subject to the proviso in s 3(2) that
incompatible legislation remains valid and of full effect and enforceability.
40 s 1(1).
41 This is because s 5 includes within it a reference to a "rule of law" that is
incompatible with the Convention, and, as noted in the text, the expression "rule of
law" is defined in s 1(1) to include the "common law."
42 See eg A v B plc (n 2 above), at 546: "Under section 6 of the [HRA], the court, as
a public authority, is required not to act 'in a way which is incompatible with a
Convention right.' The court is able to achieve this by absorbing the rights which
Arts 8 and 10 protect into the long-established action for breach of confidence."
43s 6(2).
41 See the differing views expressed as the scope of horizontal effect on the common
law in Venables and Thompson (n 2 above) at 917, Douglas, (n 2 above) at 993-4,
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- to be obliged to make whatever changes to the common law are necessary
to achieve compatibility, given that the HRA does not limit the section 6(1)
duty by reference to existing incompatible common law.45
Furthermore, the interpretative obligation in section 2(1) ECHRA is itself
less strong than that contained in section 3(1) HRA: the duty is expressed to
be "subject to rules of law relating to such interpretation and application" - a
phrase that appears to make that obligation subject to existing restraints upon
how far the judges may develop the common law. In other words, the
interpretative obligation in section 2(1) does not, as the duty in section 3(1)
HRA does, replace existing rules of interpretation; rather, it takes effect
"subject to" them. Thus the obligation on Irish judges to interpret common
law compatibly with the Convention is significantly weaker than that lying
upon their English counterparts.
There is a further, perhaps even more noteworthy feature of the ECHRA in
relation to this point: the deliberate omission of "courts" from those organs
of the state obligated to act compatibly with the Convention by section
3(1).46 This weakens the duty on Irish courts further, in comparison to
English courts, which, per section 6(3), are explicitly included within the
definition of public authorities bound to act compatibly with the Convention
rights under section 6(1) HRA. In particular, this omission would appear to
suggest that the exercise of judicial discretion in relation, for example, to
exclusion of evidence and - significantly for our purposes - the granting of
remedies, is not caught by the ECHRA. Thus, in deciding whether, for
example, to grant an injunction restraining publication of confidential
information, a judge may not be strictly bound by the ECHRA to act
compatibly with the Convention. Thus, whilst it may confidently be
predicted that the ECHRA will increase the Convention's impact on Irish
common law, that impact will be not only indirect, but appears likely to take
the form of a general radiating influence rather than strong interpretative
effect.
We turn now to the main concern of this article, the public interest defence in
Irish law, and the possible future impact of Article 10 ECHR upon it.
1002, 1112, A v B (n 2 above) at 546 and Campbell (n 2 above) at 658. For
discussion see Phillipson, n 2 above, at 729-32.
'5 This is indeed the view of Murray Hunt: "The Horizontal Effect of the Human
Rights Act" (1998) PL 423. His view is one with which a number of others,
including Lester and Pannick ("The Impact of the Human Rights Act on Private
Law: The Knight's Move" (2000) 116 LQR 380); and J. Beatson and S. Grosz:
("Horizontality: A Footnote" (2000) 116 LQR 385) appear broadly to sympathise.
H.W.R. Wade, as is well known, sees an even more expansive role for the court
under s 6(1): "Horizons of Horizontality" (2000) 116 LQR 217.
46 See the definition of "organs of the state" in s 1(1). This omission is criticised by,
eg R. Murphy, "The Incorporation of the ECHR Into Irish Domestic Law" [2001]
6 EHRLR 640, at 655.
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THE PUBLIC INTEREST DEFENCE IN THE IRISH LAW OF
BREACH OF CONFIDENCE
The Public Interest Test - Introduction
NIB v RTE is now the leading Irish decision on the public interest defence in
breach of confidence. A significant concern relating to the development of
the doctrine of confidence in its own right and in future as a remedy for
invasion of privacy, is the fear that the action will pose an unacceptable
restraint on media freedom since it prevents the disclosure of truthful facts.
The main insurance against this possibility rests with the public interest
defence, whereby disclosure of admittedly private or confidential
information is permitted if this would serve the public interest. It is
necessary first to consider the competing formulations of the public
interest/no confidence in iniquity test, and their resolution by the Supreme
Court in NIB v RTE.
Non-Iniquity As A Definitional Element Of Confidence?
Although it has been pointed out above that the decision in NIB v RTE added
little to understandings as to the scope and nature of the duty of confidence,
it did clarify the duty in one important sense. The traditional approach to this
matter is encapsulated in the maxim that that there is no confidence in
iniquity and this point was touched on by Keane J in NIB v RTE: it can be
taken to mean that the plaintiff cannot pray in aid the equitable jurisdiction of
the court to conceal his or her own wrong-doing.47 This means that any
public interest in disclosure does not operate as a defence; rather, where
iniquity is shown, the information does not have the quality of confidentiality
(partly on the ground that it is not in the public interest for such wrong-doing
to be concealed). Judges sometimes do not acknowledge the implications of
relying on the "no confidence in iniquity rule": taken literally it precludes the
exercise of balancing the interest in confidentiality against the public interest
in disclosure, since if there is no confidentiality in the first place (due to
iniquity) then clearly the court would never reach the stage of considering
any arguments against keeping the material confidential. Thus to talk of the
rule as the basis of the public interest test, as Keane J did in NIB v RTE, is to
create doctrinal confusion. The other, more prevalent, view is that the public
interest justifies a disclosure that would otherwise be a breach of confidence.
Following the first view, the non-iniquitous nature of the information would
be a necessary element in demonstrating that the ingredients of breach of
confidence were present. The judgments in NIB v RTE appear to proceed on
the basis of the second view and it can be assumed therefore that it will
continue to prevail. For the reasons given in the next section, it is submitted
that this view is the more satisfactory one, in readily allowing for a balancing
act to take place between different public interests, which also allows for the
influence of constitutional and ECHR guarantees of freedom of expression.
47 See eg Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 LJ Ch 113, at 114; and in relation to
copyright, Glyn v Weston Feature Film Co [1916] 1 Ch 261.
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The Value Of The Balancing Exercise
Keane J (speaking for the minority, but in this case in a passage which was in
harmony with the approach of the majority) found:
"The English authorities indicated that the appropriate
approach was for the courts to engage in a balancing exercise,
described as follows by Goff LJ in AG v Guardian
Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 A.C. 109 at p 282: '. . . although
the basis of the law's protection of confidence is that there is a
public interest that confidences should be preserved and
protected by the law, nevertheless that public interest may be
outweighed by some other countervailing public interest which
favours disclosure ... It is this limiting principle which may
require a court to carry out a balancing operation, weighing the
public interest in maintaining confidence against a
countervailing public interest favouring disclosure.' "'
Keane J concluded: "it can be said with confidence that the 'balancing'
approach suggested by the English authorities can be adopted in this
jurisdiction in a case such as the present." Lynch J also accepted implicitly
that the exercise to be engaged in one of balancing: "the public interest in
such publication [relating to wrong-doing] may outweigh the public interest
in the maintenance of confidentiality."49
In terms of the possibility that the doctrine of confidence will broaden in
Ireland under the impact of the ECHRA 2003 in order to become something
closer to a privacy remedy, the "balancing exercise" formulation, as opposed
to a formulation within which "non-iniquity" becomes an aspect of the
definitional elements of confidence, is to be preferred. The exercise provides
greater flexibility for taking account of the weight of free speech interests,
and for balancing them against any privacy interests raised. A formulation in
which "non-iniquity" became a definitional element of confidence could
invite paternalistic determinations of the court as to the morality of the
plaintiff's conduct, without affording him or her a full opportunity to put
forward argument as to the weight of the privacy interest involved. For
example, a particularly intrusive method of obtaining the information could
be taken into account (as in Francome v MGN, which concerned an illegal
telephone tap)5" or the particularly intimate nature of the information
revealed. Definitional balancing on the American model has some
superficial attractions in relation to conflicts between privacy and free
speech, but the methods of balancing the two rights put forward by
commentators in relation to Articles 8 and 10"' (discussed below), and by
48 n 7 above, at 482.
41 Ibid, at para 44.
'o [1984] 1 WLR 892, at 898.
51 See Phillipson and Fenwick, n 18 above (MLR), at 683-91; H. Rogers and H.
Tomlinson QC, "Privacy and Expression: Convention Rights and Interim
Injunctions" [2003] EHRLR 37-54.
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some judges in the UK52 provide, we will argue, a more subtle and nuanced
method of weighing up the two interests against each other.
The definitive adoption of the "balancing exercise" approach in NIB v RTE
has in this sense opened the door to the movement from confidence towards
privacy and from a narrowly drawn notion of "public interest" towards a
recognition of the importance of freedom of expression - a movement which
has already occurred in English law, largely under the impetus of the HRA.
A different or narrower formulation of the exercise would have been likely to
stifle that movement. Further, while the notion of "balance" does not
provide much guidance as to the method of carrying out the exercise and
may appear to be ". . . an invitation to judicial idiosyncrasy" as Gummow J
has put it,53 the development of that exercise which can now occur, especially
under the impetus of the ECHRA, provides criteria which can be used in
determining the issues without resorting to judicial commonsense or
"adhocery", a matter discussed further below.
The Scope And Content Of The Public Interest Defence After
NIB v RTE
Article 10 of the ECHR had little influence upon the public interest defence
in English law prior to the inception of the HRA,54 but this has changed
markedly in the post-HRA era. The defence as considered in NIB v RTE is
still quite narrow. It is possible that the impact of Article 10 in this context
under the ECHRA 2003 will in time follow a similar pattern, although, as
discussed above, the influence of Article 10 is likely to be significantly
weaker in Irish than in English law, given the weaker form of
"incorporation" opted for by the Irish Parliament. However, it is important
to point out that the post-HRA authorities in the UK, such as Douglas v
Hello!5 and A v B plc,56 will themselves be likely to influence the
development of the doctrine of confidence in Ireland. Thus the doctrine in
Irish law will come under pressure to respond to Article 10 from two
directions.
(a) The coverage of the defence: dependency on wrong-doing?
In English law, the "public interest defence" moved away from the limitation
imposed by the link to iniquity: in other words, it allowed a broader range of
factors than merely the revelation of misconduct to be taken into account.
The House of Lords found obiter in British Steel Corporation v Granada
Television5 7 that publication of confidential information could legitimately be
52 See, for example, Re S (a child) [2003] 2 FCR 577; Douglas I (n 2 above), both
discussed below.
53 Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v Department of Community Services
[1990] FSR 617.
5 See eg Jacob J's pre-HRA judgment in Michael Barrymore [1997] FSR 600
which, in a case relating to the unauthorised disclosure of personal information
and thus clearly raising both privacy and speech issues, did not once advert to the
Convention.
55 [2001] QB 967, at 997.
56 [2002] 3 WLR 542.
17 [1981] AC 1096; [1981] 1 All ER 417 (HL).
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undertaken only where there was misconduct,58 but in Lion Laboratories v
Evans59 Stephenson LJ said that he would reject the "no iniquity, no public
interest rule," agreeing with Lord Denning's statement in Fraser v Evans6 to
the effect that "some things are required to be disclosed in the public interest
in which case no confidence can be prayed in aid to keep them secret and
[iniquity] is merely an instance of just cause and excuse for breaking
confidence." W v Egdel1' and Hellewell2 also indicate that the defence
continued to broaden its focus of concern with the result that the strength of
the public interest in question rather than the individual wrongdoing of the
plaintiff became the determining factor. In W v Egdell, no wrongdoing was
relied upon in finding that the medical report relating to the plaintiff's
condition should be placed before the appropriate authorities where it was in
the public interest to do so. It should be pointed out that there may in certain
circumstances be further competing public interests. In X v Y3 there was
found to be a further specific public interest in maintaining confidentiality.
A newspaper wished to publish information deriving from confidential
hospital records which showed that certain practicing doctors were suffering
from the AIDS virus. In granting an injunction preventing publication, Rose
J took into account the public interest in disclosure, but weighed it against
the private interest in confidentiality and the public interest in encouraging
AIDS patients to seek help from hospitals, which would not be served if it
was thought that confidentiality might not be maintained. It may be
concluded that these rulings accepted the possibility of the existence of a
broadly-based public interest defence, not based on iniquity or indeed on any
form of wrong-doing by the plaintiff.
In NIB v RTE at first instance, Shanley J found that it would be unwise to
define the boundaries of the public interest exception, but held that
"misdeeds of a serious nature and importance to the country will justify
disclosure.' 64 But he also went on to offer a more expansive approach to the
defence, commenting that, "the countervailing public interest is that of the
public being kept informed on matters which are of real public concern." He
added: "A further public interest, of course, is the public interest in
preserving freedom of expression, which ... is enshrined in Article 40.6.1 of
[the Irish Constitution]." On the facts he found that disclosure was justified.
In the Supreme Court the minority and majority judges agreed that there
should be disclosure where there has been wrong-doing, although they
disagreed as to whether that disclosure should be only to the proper
authorities (as the minority held) or should extend to publication to the
public at large. Lynch J in the majority said: "There is also a public interest
58 See further: Cripps (1984) 4 OJLS 184 on the public interest defence.
" [1985] QB 526, at 537.
60 [1969] 1 QB 349, at 362.
61 [1990] Ch 359; see also X v Y [1 988] 2 All ER 658, and dicta of Lord Goff in AG
v Guardian Newspapers (No 2), n 9 above, at 659. Egdell concerned a decision to
breach confidence by placing details of the plaintiff's mental disorder before the
appropriate authorities because it was thought that he constituted a risk to the
public.62 [1995] 1 WLR 804.
63 [1988] 2 All ER 648.
64 n 7 above, at 475.
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in defeating wrong-doing and [this] ... may outweigh the public interest in
the maintenance of confidentiality." "Wrong-doing" is a broad term but it
appears to take the British Steel Corporation v Granada Television rather
than the Lion Laboratories line. Thus is it is quite a narrow formulation of
the defence compared to that accepted in English law even pre-HRA.
Lynch J appeared to introduce a further qualification: at one point in the
judgment he said:
"There is also a public interest in defeating wrong doing and
where the publication of confidential information may be of
assistance in defeating wrong-doing then the public interest in
such publication may outweigh the public interest in the
maintenance of confidentiality."6"
But when he came actually to decide the case before him, the judge relied
upon a much more general formulation:
"I certainly agree that the defendant should fumish its
information to [the proper] authorities and especially if it is
asked for such information by such authorities, but the
allegation which it makes is of serious tax evasion and this is a
matter of genuine interest and importance to the general public
and especially the vast majority who are law abiding tax
payers and I am satisfied that it is in the public interest that the
general public should be given this information."66
The italicized qualifying words used in his first formulation of the defence
went largely to its scope; the second formulation could be viewed as relating
to the extent of the disclosure. If his first formulation were to be relied upon
as delimiting the scope of the defence it would narrow the defence quite
considerably. It appears to allow publication only where that would assist in
defeating wrong-doing, and since publication of matter relating to wrong-
doing is usually likely to have quite a tenuous connection with defeating it,
this formulation would severely restrict the circumstances in which
publication of confidential material may be permissible in the public interest.
However, although Lynch J's formulations of the defence are not free from
ambiguity, it is arguable that his second formulation could be read as relating
to both scope and extent and therefore as indicating that a broad formulation
- based on wrong-doing but also on the strength of the public interest -
would support publication to the public at large, where those tests were
satisfied.
Keane J in the minority appeared at one point in his judgment to adopt a
broader formulation of the defence. Having reviewed the English
authorities, he noted that, following the more recent ones, in particular Lion
Laboratories (concerning disclosure of information about the inaccuracy of
the Intoximeter used to test for drink driving), the public interest defence
could reach beyond misconduct and cover information disclosing a "danger
to the public". The term "danger" is ambiguous - related to Lion
Laboratories it could be viewed as covering the danger of a miscarriage of
65 Ibid, at 494 (emphasis added).
6 Ibid, at 495.
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justice, since drivers could be convicted of drink-driving offences on the
basis of inaccurate readings of the level of alcohol in their bloodstream. But
in its natural meaning the term has an exclusionary tendency since it could be
viewed as connoting some sort of physical danger. However, since Keane J
relied on Lion Laboratories it may be suggested that he was referring to
matters of strong public interest where sections of the public at large or most
of the public could be endangered or placed at risk in some way by the
activity revealed by the information in question. (On one view, of course,
Lion Laboratories could be seen as referring narrowly to physical danger
since had a driver been stopped but found wrongly to be under the limit an
accident could subsequently have occurred. However, this is not the view
that is taken of its ratio in England, as the discussion above demonstrates.) In
his conclusion, Keane J, referring to the authorities that "should be followed
in this jurisdiction," reverted to a narrower formulation of the defence: "the
authorities . . . make it clear that where someone is in possession of
confidential information establishing that serious misconduct has taken place
or is contemplated, the courts should not prevent disclosure ... ,67 Thus his
earlier finding was not reflected in his conclusion. However, the former
dicta suggested some sympathy with the broader formulation of the defence.
A leading commentary on the decision viewed these tentative pointers
towards such a formulation as of particular significance, remarking: "it is to
be hoped that an Irish court, when asked to address the issue squarely, will
follow his dictum."68
If this broader formulation of the defence is accepted in future in the Irish
courts it would accord with Lion Laboratories and with the later English
authorities, but not with the majority view in NIB v RTE as expressed by
Lynch J - even if one omits the limiting words referring to publication as
having to be of "assistance" in defeating wrong-doing. However, Lynch J
did not need to advert to the wider view of the defence on the facts before
him - since wrong-doing had clearly occurred-and therefore the way is still
open to develop it on these broader lines. We would suggest that this wider
formulation is to be preferred, since it is more consistent with the principles
one would expect to be at stake in a test based on the "public interest." The
most compelling matter under such a test would be expected to be the depth
of that interest - in the sense that the information conveys serious and
weighty matters of legitimate concern to the public, rather than the degree of
culpability of the plaintiff. Clearly also, a broader formulation of the test
tends to afford greater weight to the freedom of the media as watchdog
bodies with a duty to inform the public of matters of public interest; since
Article 10 is now afforded further effect in Irish law under the ECHRA,
adoption of a test which is Article 10-friendly is a step in the direction of
ensuring greater harmony between this area of the law and the Convention -
as required by section 2 ECHRA. Such a stance would also accord with the
67 Ibid at 487. The full quotation is: "The authorities to which I have already
referred and which, I am satisfied, should be followed in this jurisdiction, make it
clear that where someone is in possession of confidential information establishing
that serious misconduct has taken place or is contemplated, the courts should not
prevent disclosure to persons who have a proper interest in receiving information."
See P. Lavery, "National Irish Bank v RTE - the Defence of Public Interest in
Irish Law" (1998) CLP 111, at 114.
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preservation of freedom of expression in accordance with Article 40.6 of the
Constitution.
(b) The impact of Article 10 - moving towards even broader
formulations of the Irish public interest test?
A number of Strasbourg decisions could be cited to illustrate the likely
impact of Article 10 on the public interest defence, but the decision in
Fressoz and Roire v France,69 illustrates the point particularly clearly, in part
because of the similarity of the facts of the case to those of NIB v RTE.
The applicants in Fressoz were journalists. During a period of industrial
unrest within the Peugeot motor car company, caused by the refusal of the
management, led by M. Calvet, to award pay increases to the workforce, they
published an article revealing the very large pay rises awarded during that
period to M. Calvet himself. They proved the truth of this story by quoting
figures from, and reproducing part of, M. Calvet's tax return, which had been
sent to them anonymously. A criminal investigation relating to the theft of
the tax returns by employees at the tax office was launched, but no-one there
was charged. The applicants, however, were convicted of the offence of
handling confidential information obtained through a breach of professional
confidence by an unidentified tax official and of handling stolen photocopies
of M. Calvet's tax assessment; they were fined around £1,000 and £500
respectively. They applied to Strasbourg, alleging a breach of Article 10
ECHR.
The key issue under Article 10 was whether, as the applicants claimed, the
article revealed matters of serious public interest. The Court found that it
did:
"The article was published during an industrial dispute -
widely reported in the press - at one of the major French car
manufacturers . . . The article showed that the company
chairman had received large pay increases during the period
under consideration while at the same time opposing his
employees' claims for a rise. By making such a comparison
against that background, the article ... was not intended to
damage Mr Calvet's reputation but to contribute to the more
general debate on a topic that interested the public (see, for
example, Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) A 239, page
28)."'70
The Court continued:
"Not only does the press have the task of imparting
information and ideas on matters of public interest: the public
also has a right to receive them... That is particularly true in
the instant case, as issues concerning employment and pay
generally attract considerable attention. Consequently, an
interference with the exercise of press freedom cannot be
69 (2001)31 EHRR2.
70 Ibid, at para 50.
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compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is
justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest. 71
In this case, far from there being such an overriding interest, there were
particular reasons why the arguments against disclosure were weak: the
information was not strictly confidential, since it was available on public
record;72 it did not, moreover, fall within M Calvet's private life;' thus
Article 8 was not engaged as a countervailing consideration to the applicant's
claim under Article 10. However, the case remains illuminating as a contrast
to the decision in NIB v RTE. First of all it clearly illustrates (although this
barely needs re-affirming) that in considering restrictions on speech, a court
applying Article 10 must go beyond considering whether the publication in
question discloses serious wrong-doing which the public interest would
benefit from having revealed. It is clear that in this case there was no
"wrong-doing" (except perhaps in a political sense) to be revealed: there was
no fraud, crime or anti-social behaviour in question. The information was
important, however, insofar as it contributed to a serious public debate as to
the management of Peugeot and, in particular, alleged unfairness and greed
on the part of the management. A court applying a narrow public interest
test which insisted that there must be a public interest served by the
revelation of serious wrong-doing would therefore have presumably come to
the conclusion that in this case publication should not be permitted - the
reverse of the conclusion unanimously reached by the European Court of
Human Rights. Fressoz thus establishes in the clearest possible way that the
requirement of serious wrong-doing, as an essential element to the public
interest test, or even that of a "danger" to the public should be dropped by
the Irish Courts if they are inclined to use section 2 ECHRA to bring Irish
law fully into line with the demands of Article 10, as interpreted in Fressoz.
It may be therefore said that three possible formulations of the defence are
now evident: first, that based on the plaintiffs culpability in relation to
matters of serious public concern; second that based on revealing a "danger"
to the public; finally, that based on matters of serious public concern where
no such danger is evident - as in Fressoz. Obviously the final one is by far
the broadest and encompasses the other two. The jurisprudence of the
English courts demonstrates that they have moved through all three
formulations and at present adhere to the third. Indeed, as discussed below,
they have, post-HRA, arguably moved beyond the third towards embracing
publication on extremely flimsy public interest grounds. The Irish courts, as
NIB v RTE confirms, adhere at present to the first, although they show a
tentative receptivity towards the second.
(c) Extent of the disclosure
Fressoz also illustrates, we would suggest, that Article 10 requires a much
more generous attitude towards the circumstances in which disclosure may
be made in the press, as opposed merely to the proper authorities; again this
71 Ibid, at para 51 (emphasis added).
72 Ibid, at para 53.
73 Ibid, at para 50. This was because it concerned the financial affairs of a public
figure.
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is a matter from which Irish courts may also draw guidance from English
decisions, including those made prior to the HRA.
In W v Egdel74 the notion of wrongdoing was not relied upon in finding that
the medical report relating to the plaintiffs condition should be placed
before the appropriate authorities where it was in the public interest to do so.
But it should be noted that this decision placed some limitations on the
ability of the public interest defence to afford protection to press freedom: it
was found that it might sometimes be appropriate to pass information to a
particular body rather than disclosing it to the public at large.75 In NIB v
RTE the minority judges considered that disclosure should be limited to the
revenue authorities, and that in terms of the two interest involved there was
no need for disclosure to the public at large: in other words, the public
interest in confidentiality outweighed that in relation to wrong-doing as far as
wider disclosure went. But the majority, weighing up the two interests,
favoured wider disclosure on the basis of the seriousness of the behaviour,
taking into account the fact that the public as a whole has an interest in tax
evasion.
It is worth noting, under the minority view as to the extent of the disclosure,
that if permissible disclosure in such instances was to be confined to
particular bodies - usually state regulators - then investigative journalism
would tend to be stifled since the media would have little interest in acting -
in effect - as the unpaid investigative arm of the state. Clearly, it is the
function of the media to root out abuses, but it is a more important function,
as the European Court of Human Rights pointed out in Fressoz and on
numerous other occasions, to inform the public. Thus it could be argued that
there is a public interest in allowing wider disclosure (although clearly it
would not prevail in every instance) for this reason in itself. The impact of
the ECHRA may tend to broaden the thinking of Irish judges in cases of this
nature in terms of acceptance of a human rights culture. Although the
outcome in NIB v RTE was a media-friendly one, the reasoning is not: the
judges of the Supreme Court did not at any point advert to the value of
freedom of expression or to the significance of the media in terms of rooting
out abuses of power or corruption as in the instance under consideration.
Lynch J seemed concerned merely with the culpability of the plaintiff and its
clients, not with the importance of free expression more generally.
Ironically, although Keane J's judgment appeared to take some account of
free expression values in the sense that his formulation of the public interest
test was the broader one, he then formulated a testfor the extent of disclosure
which was very narrow and which would tend, as pointed out above, to
discourage investigative journalism.
74 [1990] Ch 59.
75 Where disclosure has been said to be in the public interest because it exposes
particular criminal or anti-social behaviour or reveals some specific risk to public
health, it has been held that this will not always justify disclosing the matter in the
press: see Francome [1984] 1 WLR 892; Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1
QB 396, at 405-06, per Lord Denning; AG v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990]
1 AC 109, at 269, perLord Griffiths; ibid, at 282, perLord Goff; ibid, at 177,per
Sir John Donaldson in the Court of Appeal.
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WEIGHING UP MEDIA FREEDOM AGAINST
CONFIDENTIALITY/PRIVACY - HOW TO CONDUCT THE
BALANCING EXERCISE
It is of interest to ask by what reasoning process in their decision in NIB v
RTE, the Supreme Court determined (a), that the public interest in knowing
of the tax evasion scheme and those involved in it outweighed the interest in
confidentiality; and (b), that disclosure should be to the public at large. As
regards (a), Lynch J said: "the allegation which it makes is of serious tax
evasion and this is a matter of genuine interest and importance to the general
public and especially the vast majority who are law abiding tax payers." He
also found:
".. . greater consideration must be given to the publication of
the names of and related information about customers and their
accounts. [The evidence - the affidavit] establishes a strong
primafacie case that at least the greater number of the Clerical
Medical Insurance Company Limited policy investors were
doing so for the purposes of tax evasion..."
- and held that no injunction should be issued to protect their identities. As
regards (b), Lynch J agreed that the information should be given by the
defendants to the Inland Revenue, but also said: "I am satisfied that it is in
the public interest that the general public should be given this information."
Arguably, this conclusion was quite clearly justified here, since the case
concerned criminal activity. However, the reasoning affords no indications
as to how to conduct the balancing exercise in less clear-cut cases. If the
public interest defence continues to broaden in Ireland as it has done in
England, methods of balancing the interests in question sensitively against
each other in the hard cases will have to be developed. However, the precise
methodology to be used will vary, depending upon the nature of the interest
in preventing disclosure in the particular case.
At present, once the applicant has established a prima facie breach of
confidence, the onus switches to the defendant to establish that there is a
sufficiently strong public interest to override the duty of confidentiality and
allow publication. This was precisely the approach taken in NIB v RTE. The
court took confidentiality as its starting point and viewed freedom of
expression as - in effect - an exception to it, under the rubric of the public
interest test. The words "in effect" are used advisedly: none of the judges in
the Supreme Court expressly adverted to the effects of Article 10 of the
Convention or to Article 40.6 of the Constitution, and this in spite of the fact
that the remedy sought by the plaintiff amounted to prior restraint of the
media. Now that Article 10 has been afforded further effect under the
ECHRA 2003, the structure of this reasoning ought to change, but we would
suggest that precisely how it will change will depend upon whether the court
is engaged in weighing up confidentiality or privacy rights against freedom
of expression.
Cases Concerning Confidentiality Versus Freedom Of Expression
If what is in issue is confidentiality but not privacy interests (for example in
a case concerning commercial secrets) the onus will lie on the applicant to
show that confidentiality, admittedly a legitimate aim under paragraph 2 of
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Article 10, justifies restricting expression. Thus confidentiality would be
viewed as an exception - to be "narrowly interpreted"76 - to the primary
guarantee of freedom of expression. To make out an exception, as is well
known, it must be shown that there is a pressing social need to restrain
publication and that the measures taken are proportionate to the legitimate
aim of maintaining confidentiality. The latter factor will demand that
particularly close attention be paid to the question whether an injunction -
representing a far more serious restriction on speech - should be granted, or
whether the plaintiff should be left to his or her remedy in damages and or/an
account of profits. As is well known, the European Court of Human Rights
has found that prior restraint demands the "most careful scrutiny."'77 The
term "public interest" defence would no longer appear to be appropriate -
unless the courts took the view that issues of public interest could be viewed
separately from those of freedom of expression - since, as seen in the
judgment of in Fressoz, confidentiality becomes a defence to the media's
claim of freedom of expression, rather than the other way around.
The Irish Courts in some cases have indeed already arrived at a position
similar to that just described. For example, in Attorney General for England
and Wales v Brandon Books,78 Caroll J held: "in my opinion there is prima
facie a constitutional right to publish information and the onus rests on the
plaintiff to establish in the context of an interlocutory application that the
constitutional right of the defendant should not be exercised." What was "at
stake [was] the very important constitutional right to communicate now and
not in a year or more."
As O'Dell puts it, O'Hanlon J in Maguire v Drury79 "all but announced a
rule against prior restraint":80
"It appears to me that the balance of convenience [in deciding
whether to grant an injunction] should also take into account
the general undesirability of holding up - perhaps for years -
the publication of material when the ultimate decision is likely
to be that it was quite lawful to publish. Otherwise the
interlocutory injunction could be used effectively to encroach
in a significant manner on the freedom of the press."'"
However, it is clear that such an approach was not even adverted to in NIB v
RTE, despite the fact that the case clearly raised the issue of media freedom.
It is therefore by no means firmly established in Irish law.
Cases Concerning Privacy Versus Freedom Of Expression
If instead, the information, as well as being confidential, also relates to
private life under Article 8, then it is clear that a different approach from that
seen in cases such as NIB v RTE should be followed under the ECHRA in
76 Sunday Times v UK (1979-80)2 EHRR 245.
77 See Observer and Guardian v UK(1991) 14 EHRR 153, at para 60.
78 [1986] IR 597.
79 [1995] ILRM 108.80 O'Dell, n 8 above, at 211.
81 Ibid, at 116.
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order to avoid denying privacy its status as a Convention right. 2 This can be
briefly illustrated by examples from post-HRA English decisions in which
the courts have grappled with the issue of how to deal with cases that raise
issues under both Articles 8 and 10.83
In Venables and Thompson, counsel representing the press argued:
"There was a presumption in favour of freedom of expression,
which was a primary right in a democracy. It was not a
question of a balancing exercise by the court. A balancing
exercise would presume that the scales started in equal
balance. That was not the correct approach."
8 4
In Theakston, Counsel similarly submitted that:
".. . the court should follow the approach set out in Sunday
Times v UK (1979) . . . in which the [European Court of
Human Rights] said that the Court in deciding whether a given
interference with free expression was necessary in a
democratic society 'is faced not with a choice between two
conflicting principles, but with a principle of freedom of
expression that is subject to a number of exceptions which
must be narrowly interpreted. 8 5
Such propositions can indeed apparently be found in numerous English dicta
of the highest authority. In Reynolds v Times Newspapers6 for example,
Lord Steyn pronounced:
"The starting point, is now the right of freedom of expression,
a right based on a . . . higher legal order foundation.
Exceptions . . . must be justified as being necessary in a
democracy. In other words, freedom of expression is the rule,
and regulation of speech is the exception requiring
justification."
The difficulty here is that in following the common law right to freedom of
expression established in Reynolds, Derbyshire87 and Simms,"8 which, even
before incorporation, had raised freedom of expression to the status of a
genuine constitutional right, rather than merely a residual liberty, the courts
have failed to appreciate a key point. These cases were not decided in the
context of the conflict of freedom of expression with another fundamental
right; thus they cannot be applied simpliciter to circumstances in which such
a clash is the very issue that the court must resolve. As the authors pointed
out, before the coming into force of the HRA:
82 Such an approach would also take account of the impact of the English post-HRA
case-law.
83 For a full account, see Phillipson, n 2 above, at 748-58. We draw on this material
in the section that follows.
84 n 2 above, at 913.
85 n 2 above, at 31.
86 [1999] 4 All ER 609, at 629.
87 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers [1993] AC 534.
88 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115.
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"If [The Sunday Times case] approach were to be applied in
domestic privacy cases, the result would be that privacy would
lose its Convention status as a fully-fledged right, becoming
instead merely a narrowly interpreted exception to the right of
freedom of expression. Such an approach, we would argue,
could not be right. It would introduce a striking asymmetry
whereby the protection of the right to privacy would have to be
justified as necessary in a democratic society, while the claims
of free speech would be simply assumed. While the European
Court has not addressed the matter explicitly, it must be the
case that where a restriction on a Convention right is justified
not as serving one of the societal interests the Convention
enumerates, such as economic well-being or protection of
morals, but in order to protect another primary Convention
right, a different approach should be followed."89
To put it in another way, to treat privacy rights under Article 8 in the same
way as the societal interests enumerated in Article 10(2), simply collapses
the basic scheme of the Convention which, as a human rights treaty is,
axiomatically, to afford human rights a special status over other interests.
Arguably, the post-HRA decisions in A v B,90 Theakston MGN9  and Mills v
News Group Newspapers92 all fell into this trap,93 but the problem is most
clearly illustrated by the approach the court took in the well-known decision
of Venables and Thompson, which concerned an application for an injunction
contra omnes to prevent publication of the details of the identity and
whereabouts of the two juvenile killers of Jamie Bulger. Butler Sloss P
stated:
"The onus of proving the case that freedom of expression must
be restricted is firmly upon the applicant seeking the relief.
The restrictions sought must ... be shown to be ... justifiable
as necessary to satisfy a strong and pressing social need,
convincingly demonstrated, to restrain the Press . . . and
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued."94
Her Ladyship went on:
"I am satisfied that I can only restrict the freedom of the media
to publish if the need for those restrictions can be shown to fall
within the exceptions set out in Article 10(2). In considering
the limits to the law of confidence, and whether a remedy is
available to the claimants within those limits, I must interpret
narrowly those exceptions."95
89 Phillipson and Fenwick, n 18 above (MLR), at 686.
90 n 2 above. While certain general passages in the judgment suggest a more
balanced approach, the way that the conflict between the two rights was resolved
in the particular case did indeed exemplify this tendency.91 n 2 above.
92 n 2 above.
93 See Phillipson, n 2 above, at 751-52.
94 n 2 above, at 921.
95 Ibid, at 931 (emphasis added).
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The point missed here, however, is that the relevant exceptions here were
other Convention rights - the rights to life, to freedom from torture or
inhuman treatment and to privacy. In other words, the judge regarded herself
as being bound to make sure that Convention rights other than Article 10
were "narrowly interpreted" and, crucially, that claimants wishing to enjoy
those other Convention rights should only lawfully be allowed to do so if
they could show that this was "necessary." The judgment takes us to the
bizarre situation in which a claim of Article 10 automatically relegates all
other Convention rights - including the right to life and to freedom from
torture - to the status of narrowly construed exceptions. Such an approach,
giving freedom of expression presumptive priority over all other Convention
rights, amounts to a radical distortion of the basic Convention scheme.
However, the need for a different approach has started to find
acknowledgment both in the courts and by other academic commentators on
the HRA. In Douglas, the argument as to the structural priority to be given
to freedom of expression was evidently put to the court and - in perhaps the
most important aspect of the judgments - it was rejected. This is in spite of
the fact that section 12(4) HRA instructs the courts, inter alia, to have
"particular regard" to freedom of expression. But Sedley LJ's reasoning on
this point was emphatic:
"The European Court has always recognised the high
importance of free media of communication in a democracy,
but its jurisprudence does not - and could not consistently with
the Convention itself - give Article 10(1) the presumptive
priority which is given, for example, to the First Amendment
in the... United States. Everything will ultimately depend on
the proper balance between privacy and publicity in the
situation facing the court."96
Some support has very recently been given to this view in the judgment of
Simon Brown LJ in Cream Holdings Ltd v Bannerjee:97
"It is one thing to say... that the media's right to freedom of
expression, particularly in the field of political discussion "is
of a higher order" than "the right of an individual to his good
reputation"; it is, however, another thing to rank it higher than
competing basic rights."
Or, as Lindsay J put it in Douglas 11, "there is no 'presumptive priority'
given to freedom of expression when it is in conflict with another
Convention right."98
What, therefore, would be the better approach? We have argued previously
that, instead of treating Article 8 merely as an exception to Article 10,
requiring the applicant to show that interferences with the latter were
necessary and proportionate, the court, having undertaken that inquiry,
96 n 2 above, at 1004.
9' [2003] EWCA Civ 103, at para 54. The case concerned an application for an
interim injunction to restrain commercially confidential material and in particular
the construction of s 12(3) I-IRA, which sets out a new test for the grant of relief
that affects freedom of expression.98 n 2 above, at para 185(v).
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should then go on to a further stage with the rights reversed in position. At
this point:
"the speech interest [would be] treated as an exception to the
primary right to respect for privacy under Article 8; the same
enquiries as to necessity and proportionality could then be
made from this opposing perspective. In this way, useful
insights could be gleaned by asking, for example, both whether
the publication in question was more intrusive than was
necessary to its legitimate aim of provoking discussion on
matters of public interest . . . and, conversely, whether the
remedy sought by the plaintiff went further than was necessary
in order to protect the legitimate privacy interest. The claims
of both parties would thus be subject to a searching, but
balanced examination." 99
Such an approach has recently been endorsed by leading media law
practitioners Hugh Tomlinson QC and Heather Rogers, who argue that the
approach of the courts to date neglects the need to conduct such a "parallel
analysis" into the necessity of infringing the claimant's Article 8 right. 100 It
has also received some judicial endorsement: Sedley U remarked in Douglas
that both Articles (8 and 10) were qualified by each other and that when
balancing the two against each other, "the outcome ... is to be determined
principally by considerations of proportionality.'' In Harris v Harris,10 2
although there was no detailed consideration of the balancing exercise
between Articles 10 and 8, Munby J accepted that the approach adopted by
Sedley U should be followed.'03
Further very significant support for this approach may be found in the
approach of Lady Justice Hale in the Court of Appeal in Re S,'0 4 in a case
concerning the question of imposing reporting restrictions under the inherent
jurisdiction of the court in order to protect the privacy of a child. Lady
Justice Hale, who gave the leading judgment, found that the lower court had
adopted the wrong approach. In that court it had been assumed that press
freedom would be afforded primacy and that the Article 8 rights of the child
would figure merely as exceptions under Article 10(2). Having repudiated
that approach, Lady Justice Hale then went on to consider the proportionality
of the proposed interference with freedom of expression. She had to
consider under Article 10(2) what restriction, if any, was needed to meet the
legitimate aim of protecting the rights of the child. If prohibiting publication
of the family name and photographs was needed, the court had to consider
how great an impact that would in fact have upon the freedom protected by
Article 10 in the particular circumstances of the case. She then went on to
consider the matter from the perspective of the child's Article 8 rights, media
99 Fenwick and Phillipson, n 18 above (MLR), at 687.100 n 51 above, at 50-52.1 n 2 above, at 1005 (emphasis added).
102 [2001] 2 FLR 895.
103 Ibid, at para 384.
104 [2003] 2 FCR 577; (2003) 147 SJLB 873. The case concerning the possibility of
restraining media reports which would have identified the child's mother, who
was standing trial for the murder of his brother. It was thought that the publicity
would lead to the creation of greater distress for an already very vulnerable child.
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freedom figuring this time as an exception to them under Article 8(2). In
considering the proportionality of the proposed interference with the right of
the child to respect for his private and family life, the judge had to take
account of the magnitude of the interference proposed. Lady Justice Hale
came to the conclusion that since the first instance judge had not considered
each Article independently, and so had not conducted the difficult balancing
exercise required by the Convention, the appeal should be allowed, in order
that the exercise could be properly carried out by the first instance Family
Division court. The two judges in the majority disagreed, finding that
although the balancing exercise outlined by Lady Justice Hale should have
been carried out, the result reached at first instance - that the restraining
order preventing publication should be discharged - would have been
reached even if it had been properly carried out. They considered that the
first instance judge had not carried out the exercise correctly, but had had
factors relevant to the question of proportionality under Article 8 sufficiently
in mind.
The detailed practical consequences of such a reasoning process in privacy
cases are explored elsewhere' 5 and need not be repeated here. What is
perhaps more important to note is that this notion of balancing constitutional
rights on a case-by-case basis, using proportionality as the key tool in so
doing, has already been arrived at independently by academic commentators
upon the Irish constitution. O'Dell sees such a process at work in, for
example, Magee v 0 'Dea1"6 and Burke v Central Independent Television,
0 7
in which he suggests that O'Flaherty CJ saw the issue as one of balancing.
In Shaw,' a contrary approach, of assigning rights to an a priori hierarchy,
was seemingly suggested:
"If possible, fundamental rights under a Constitution should be
given a mutually harmonious application, but when that is not
possible, the hierarchy or priority of the conflicting rights must
be examined both as between themselves and in relation to the
general welfare of society. This may involve toning down or
even putting into temporary abeyance a particular guaranteed
right so that, in a fair and objective, way, the more pertinent
important right in a given set of circumstances may be
preferred and given application."
However, as O'Dell points out, although the language of hierarchy is used, in
reality the question is one of balancing: "it is not the mechanical ascription of
immutable precedence of one right over the other," but instead an assessment
"in a given set of circumstances" of which of the conflicting rights must be
put "into temporary abeyance." Under this approach "the precedence of the
rights changes according to the circumstances, which means that it is not a
hierarchy at all, but rather the result of an individuated balancing process.""9
Thus he cites McCarthy J in Attorney General v X:""
05 See Phillipson, n 2 above, 753-59.
106 1 IR 500.
107 [1994] 2IR61.
108 [1982] IR 1.
109 n 8 above, at 252-53.
''o [1992] 1 IR 1.
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"I would prefer to seek harmony between the various rights
guaranteed and to reconcile them to each other rather than rank
one higher than another."
O'Dell then arrives at the very same conclusion as that suggested above in
the context of balancing Articles 8 and 10: "Presumably, the doctrine of
harmonious interpretation further requires that the exercise of each right
restrict the other as little as possible: this is the doctrine of
proportionality."''. He suggests that this approach was seen in Heaney v
Ireland,"2 and summarises it thus:
"The doctrine, by requiring that the least restrictive invasion of
any given right be adopted so as to respect the other, would
therefore ensure that any precedence which is to be given to
one right over the other as a consequence of balancing is only
so much as is strictly necessary in the circumstances.""' 3
Thus the correct approach towards the resolution of conflicts between
Articles 8 and 10 ECHR is already indicated in previous Irish authority,
English decisions and academic commentary in both jurisdictions. It is to be
hoped that this approach will therefore be followed by Irish courts should the
development of breach of confidence in Ireland throw up conflicts between
speech and privacy interests, as this paper has suggested is highly likely, or
indeed, if any other common law or interpretative constitutional
developments give rise to a workable privacy action.
The Public Interest Test And Article 10: Related Or Separate
Enquiries?
There remains the issue of how the Irish courts are to weave Article 10 into
their existing consideration of the public interest in publication."4 It should
be noted at the outset that introducing Article 10 into the equation, as a
counterpoint to Article 8, complicates the issue on the theoretical level.
Whereas the public interest defence is by its nature wholly consequentialist
(looking to the benefits of disclosure - or the harm to be averted by it), a
freedom of expression argument relies at least in part upon the inherent right
of the individual to communicate, regardless of circumstances. For this
reason, it raises a conflict with privacy - another inherent right - in a far
more acute form. At its crudest, the court is confronted by a position in
which one party is simply entitled to his privacy, and the other is simply
entitled to invade it, by exercising his right to freedom of expression. The
solution to this problem, we suggest, lies in recognition of the fact that the
Convention rights in fact exhibit what Mullender has termed "qualified
n 8 above, at 252.
12 [1994] 3 IR 593.
1 3 n 8 above, at 254.
114 This issue is explored further in G. Phillipson, "Judicial Reasoning in Breach of
Confidence cases under the Human Rights Act: Not Taking Privacy Seriously?"
[2003] EHRLR (Privacy Special) 54, at 60-72. We draw on material from this
article in what follows.
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deontology":" 5 whilst they purport to uphold a set of human rights
established regardless of consequences, they allow for their restriction by
reference to consequentialist considerations, in pursuance of a legitimate aim
and in a manner proportionate in the circumstances. Moreover, since
Articles 10 and 8 are both qualified in favour of each other"6 (both recognise
"the rights of others" as a legitimate aim for limiting the primary right), they
also provide a method of resolving competing individual rights. As we have
previously argued, such resolution may be found through recognition of the
rights' mutual supportiveness as upholding certain, more basic values," 7 and
then through giving consideration to which of those values are more strongly
engaged by which right in the particular case. Again, this point has already
been taken in relation to balancing constitutional rights in Ireland. O'Dell
suggests that, when conducting a balancing exercise between privacy and
speech, "the courts should have regard to the justifications for each of the
rights, and the weight each carries in the constitutional order."".8
There is a persuasive case to be made out at the theoretical level that speech
consisting of reportage of the personal lives of celebrities receives little or no
support from any of the values underlying freedom of expression."' It is un-
related to the self-government rationale,"2 ' cannot generally further the
search for truth 2' and runs directly counter to the arguments from
autonomy'22 and self-development:c '23 in being calculated to deter those in the
115 See R. Mullender, "Theorising the Third Way: Qualified Consequentialism, the
Proportionality Principle and the New Social Democracy" (2000) 27(4) Journal
of Law and Society 493.1 6 As Sedley LJ remarked in Douglas, n 2 above, at 1005.
17 These include autonomy and self-development, both of which are recognized as
underlying justifications for both freedom of expression and privacy; moreover,
the right to privacy to develop one's thoughts can be seen as an essential
precursor to free expression; on this, see E. Bloustein, "Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Behaviour: an answer to Dean Prosser" (1964) 39 NUULR 962; A.
Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum: New York, 1970), at 34. For further
discussion, see Fenwick and Phillipson, n 18 above (MLR), at 682-91.
18 n 8 above, at 255.
"9 For the full argument, see Phillipson and Fenwick, n 18 above (MLR), at 680-85,
689-70. See also E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), at
191. We draw on Phillipson (n 2 above) in this section.
120 That is, the argument that since citizens cannot participate meaningfully in a
democracy unless they have a reasonable understanding of political issues, open
debate on such matters is essential to such a state. See eg A. Meiklejohn, "The
First Amendment is an Absolute" (1961) Sup Ct Rev 245 and Political Freedom
(1960), at 115-24. Privacy-invading speech may draw something from this
argument in areas where it provokes debate on matters of public concern (eg
through "outing"). However, such an argument was not raised in any of the cases
considered.
121 For the classical argument on truth, see J. S. Mill's On Liberty in M. Cowling
(ed), Selected Writings of John Stuart Mill (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1968), at 121; for commentary, see K. Greenwalt, "Free Speech
Justifications" (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 119, at 130-41.
l22 That is, the argument that freedom of speech is an essential aspect of the
individual's right to moral autonomy: see generally R. Dworkin, "Do we have a
right to pornography?" in A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1985); T. Scanlon, "A Theory of Freedom of Expression"
(1972) 1 Philosophy and Public Affairs 216.
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public eye from making controversial choices about their personal life by
forcing them, in effect, to live in a goldfish bowl, it attacks both their
autonomy'24 and their ability to flourish as individuals.'25
Within the Convention system, it is elementary that Article 10, based as it is
upon the essentiality of speech to the "development of everyone"'26 and,
above all, to the furtherance of a democratic society, 127one of the
Convention's basic aims, will be much more strongly engaged by some types
of speech than others. Specifically, political speech'28 - which most directly
engages the self-government rationale'29 - is given higher levels of
protection at Strasbourg than artistic speech,' with commercial speech
123 That is, the view that the ability to engage in the free expression and reception of
ideas and opinions in various media is essential to human flourishing. For
general discussion, see C. Emerson, "Towards a General Theory of the First
Amendment" (1963) 72 Yale LJ 877, at 879-80; M. Redish, Freedom of
Expression (Indianapolis: Michie Co, 1984), at 20-30; K. Greenwalt (n 121
above), at 143-45; J. Raz, "Free Expression and Personal Identification" (1991)
11(3) OJLS 303.
124 As a number of commentators have pointed out, intrusive publications, as well as
directly assailing informational autonomy, also indirectly threaten the ability of
humans to develop freely in substantive ways: "If people are able to release
[private] information with impunity, it might have the effect of illegitimately
constraining a person's choices as to his or her private behaviour, interfering in a
major way with his or her autonomy" (D. Feldman, "Secrecy, Dignity or
Autonomy? Views of Privacy as a Civil Liberty" 47(2) CLP 42, at 54); see also:
C. Fried, "Privacy" (1968) 77 Yale LI 475, at 483; J Rachels, "Why Privacy is
Important" (1975) 4 Philosophy and Public Affairs 323; E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller
and J. Paul, The Right to Privacy (Cambridge University Press, 2000), at 34-42.
125 As Fried notes, privacy is essential for "respect, love, friendship and trust" -
"without it they are simply inconceivable" (n 124 above, at 483). Invasion of
privacy therefore threatens these essential aspects of human self-expression and
development.
126 The ECtHR has often referred to freedom of expression as one of the "essential
foundations for the development of everyone": see eg Otto-Preminger v Austria
(1994) 19 EHRR 34, at para 49.
127 The ECtHR has repeatedly asserted that freedom of expression "constitutes one
of the essential foundations of a democratic society": see eg Observer and
Guardian v UK, n 77 above, at para 59; it has spoken of the press's vital role of
"public watchdog" in which guise it has a duty "to impart information and ideas
on matters of public interest" which the public "has a right to receive" (Castells v
Spain (1992) 14 EHRR 445, at para 43).
128 Albeit, the notion of "political" should be broadly defined to go well beyond
speech directly relating to governmental activities.
129 The argument for speech from democracy has been described by Barendt as "the
most influential theory in the development of twentieth century free speech law,"
n 119 above, at 68.
130 See D. J. Harris, M. O'Boyle and C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention
on Human Rights (Butterworths: London, 1995) at 397 and 414. Cf for example,
the decisions in the following cases, which broadly involve artistic speech: Muller
v Switzerland (1991) 13 EHRR 212; Gibson v UK (Appl. No. 17634); Handyside
v UK, A 24 (1976); Otto-Preminger Institute v Austria (1994) 19 EHRR 34; Gay
News v UK (1989) 12 EHRR 123; Wingrove v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 1, esp. at
para 58 with the following 'political speech cases': Sunday Times v UK (1979-80)
2 EHRR 245; Jersild v Denmark (1994) 19 EHRR 1; Lingens v Austria (1986) 8
EHRR 407; Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843; Bladet Tromso v
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coming a poor third. This has been recognised, in other contexts, by the UK
courts.' The disclosure of private facts about celebrities by definition
concerns the personal, not the public, sphere and will in general scarcely
engage the media's right under Article 10 to impart "information on matters
of serious public concern" 32 or more general Convention values such as the
furtherance of a democratic society.
This point has not, however, been appreciated in a number of English
decisions under the HRA. In particular, in some decisions, the courts have
chosen to treat the public interest in a story as wholly separate from the issue
of the application of Article 10, taking the view that the latter is fully
engaged even where the former is wholly absent,'33 surely a perverse stance,
given the European Court's repeated and clear invocations of the vital role of
the press in informing the public on matters of serious public concern,' and
decisions of the Court which clearly indicate that privacy-invading speech is
afforded a very low weight in the Convention system.'35 A better approach,
we argue, would be to treat considerations of public interest not as distinct
from the issue of freedom of expression, but as going to the weight of that
claim, when it is balanced against privacy. Such an approach has indeed
been approved of by dicta in Douglas - cited with approval in A v B plc -
although we argue below that it was not applied in those decisions. In
Douglas, Brooke U remarked:
"In the absence of any public interest [in the story] the Court is
especially bound to pay particular regard to the [Press
Complaints Commission Code] and a newspaper which flouts
the Code may have its claim to freedom of expression trumped
by Article 10(2) considerations of privacy."'' 36
Such an approach was applied in Douglas 11: no public interest was claimed
in the publication of the photographs and, given the obvious commercial
Norway (1999) 29 EHRR 125; News Verlags GmbH & CoKG v Austria (2001)
31 EHRR 8.
'31 See recently, Pro-Life Alliance v BBC [2002] 3 WLR 1080 (CA).
132 Bladet Tromso, n 130 above, at para 59.
133 In A v B Plc, Lord Woolf CJ said: "Any interference with the press has to be
justified because it inevitably has some effect on the ability of the press to
perform its role in society. This is the position irrespective of whether a
particular publication is desirable in the public interest" (n 2 above, at 549E,
emphasis added). In Theakston, the judge said: "I can see no public interest in the
publication of the details of the [sexual] activity" (n 2 above, at para 75); he
nevertheless found that: "the freedom of expression of the Sunday People and of
the prostitute would be given greater weight than the extra degree of intrusion
into the claimant's privacy" (ibid, at para 76).
134 See eg Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843, at para 50.
'5 See N v Portugal, app no. 20683/92 (1995) and Tammer v Estonia (2003) 37
EHRR 43. In the former, a publisher was fined and imprisoned for 15 months, a
drastic penalty by any standards, for publishing photographs of a well-known
businessman in flagrante with a number of young women. The publisher's
application under Art 10 was dismissed as manifestly ill-founded: the penalty was
found to be a proportionate response to the legitimate aim of protecting the
"rights of others", viz the business man's right to privacy and reputation. The
latter decision is discussed below.
136 n 2 above, at 994; approved inA v Bplc, n 2 above, at 554C.
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cynicism of Hello/'s actions, the judge found that the clear breaches of the
Press Complaints Commission Code through the use of surreptitious
photography were such as to tip the balance against freedom of expression. 37
This, however, is something of an isolated example in the reported cases.'38
In Douglas, the speech in question - details of a celebrity wedding - was
surely a paradigmatic case of low value, non-political speech, satisfying
nothing other than a desire for celebrity gossip. It clearly was of
substantially less public interest than, say, the speech in question in Tammer
v Estonia. '39 In that case, the criminal conviction of a journalist in respect of
an article he had written was found not to violate Article 10. In the article,
the journalist alleged that a former political aide of the Prime Minister had
deserted her children and broken up the marriage of the Prime Minister by
having an affair with him - clearly somewhat more weighty matters,
touching directly on the Prime Minister of the day, than the proposed story
and pictures in Hello!. However, the European Court of Human Rights
found that because the speech concerned the private life of the political aide,
it lacked, for that reason, any substantial public interest and therefore did not
constitute a justification for the intrusion into her private life. The court in
Douglas, in contrast, appeared to pay no heed to the manifest weakness of
the expression claim in Convention terms, while at the same time making a
shrewd analysis of the weakness of the privacy interests involved: as Sedley
U put it, "The first two claimants had sold most of the privacy they now
seek to protect to the third claimant for a handsome sum".' 4
The same phenomena appears in both A v B Plc and Theakston. Both these
decisions concerned low-value, non-political speech, closer to soft
pornography 141 than serious journalism. Moreover, the speech in question, in
holding up to public gaze intimate details of the sexual lives of its subjects,
was of a type that is arguably actually hostile to core values underlying
freedom of expression: such intrusive stories directly attack the value of
human development without outside interference from others,'42 and, through
their possible deterrent effect in threatening the humiliating exposure of
sexual irregularities, indirectly threaten substantive autonomy. "' Again,
however, the court, while showing no awareness of these clear weaknesses in
the speech claim, went to some lengths to point out the relative poverty - as
the judges saw it - of the privacy case. Indeed the court in A v B laid down
guidance to the effect that it may not even be necessary to determine the
existence of weaker privacy claims, so likely were they to be outweighed by
the claims of freedom of expression:
137 n 2 above, 204-05.
138 Expression rights did not succeed in the Venables and Thompson case (n 2
above): however, it is important to point out that in that case the boys' right to life
was engaged as a countervailing consideration.
139 See n 135 above.
140 n 2 above, at 1006, per Sedley U.
141 Sedley LJ has described it as "mildly pornographic" material: Cream Holdings, n
97 above, at 88.
142 See n 123 and 126 above. For the facts of these cases, see n 2 above.
143 For the argument that freedom of expression can best be justified by an argument
based on moral autonomy, see the works cited in n 122 above.
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"... usually the answer to the question whether there exists a
private interest worthy of protection will be obvious. In those
cases in which the answer is not obvious, an answer will often
be unnecessary. This is because the weaker the claim for
privacy, the more likely that the claim for privacy will be
outweighed by the claim based on freedom of expression. ' "
This reasoning is revealing: it shows no recognition of the proposition that
whether the privacy interest is likely to be outweighed by the speech interest
depends upon the nature of the speech in question. It thus neatly
encapsulates the unbalanced approach to the two Convention rights described
above.
The courts in both cases then went on to apply this approach, examining at
some length the weaknesses of the privacy interest, while disregarding the
nature of the speech. Given the transitory nature of the intimate relationships
in question and the fact that the other parties to them did not wish to keep
them private any longer, the Court in A v B Plc concluded: "In our view, to
grant an injunction would be an unjustified interference with the freedom of
the press."'45 In Theakston, the conclusion, reached specifically on the right
of the newspaper to convey intimate and prurient detail of the precise sexual
acts that took place between Theakston and the prostitutes was even clearer:
"I do not consider that the confidentiality or privacy case in
relation to the details of the sexual activity is nearly strong
enough to warrant the degree of restriction involved.' 146
This was said despite the fact that the judge openly conceded that conveying
such details to the public had no public interest value. 47 We would argue
that the opposite was the case in both instances: the speech in question -
conveying explicit details of the sexual activity of a celebrity - was surely of
the lowest value in Convention terms; conversely, the invasion of privacy,
entailing as it did a gross intrusion into one of the most intimate aspects of
private life - sexuality - was surely of a very grave degree. Such cases
therefore can quite straightforwardly be resolved in favour of the privacy
interest at the level of principle. But as long as the courts continue to
perceive Article 10 as engaging a one-size-fits-all weight, such a resolution
will not present itself.
The "Public Interest" In English Privacy Cases: A Development
Too Far?
The courts' particular finding on what the public interest specifically
demanded are equally of interest. In A v B plc, Lord Woolf CJ laid down as
general guidance the following:
"Even trivial facts relating to a public figure can be of great
interest to readers and other observers of the media. In many
of these situations it would be overstating the position to say
144 n 2 above, at 550C.
141 Ibid, at 561.
146 n 2 above, at para 76 (emphasis added).
147 "I can see no public interest in the publication of the details of the [sexual]
activity" (n 2 above, at 75).
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that there is a public interest in the information being
published. It would be more accurate to say that the public
have an understandable and so a legitimate interest in being
told the information. If this is the situation then it can be
appropriately taken into account by a court when deciding on
which side of the line a case falls."'"
One of the authors has criticised this reasoning extensively elsewhere.'49
Only two points need be made here: first, it collapses the distinction,
carefully maintained in successive previous judgments of the Court of
Appeal, between "the public interest" as a legal term of art on the one hand,
and what is interesting to the public on the other.5 ' Second, it takes no heed
of the fact that Strasbourg, in a number of cases, has treated publications that
invade private life as lacking, for that reason, a public interest, such that even
very draconian penalties in relation to them have readily been found to be
justified as a proportionate means of protecting private life under Article 8.
As a leading work on privacy puts it:'5'
"Where the content [of the relevant publications] amounts to a
gross invasion of privacy the Commission has had no difficulty
in considering severe penalties (including imprisonment) for
the publisher concerned to be a proportionate interference with
his right to freedom of expression.'52 Such publications are
considered to have little or no informational value worth
protecting."
The other strand of argument that the courts used to support the right to
publish in both A v B and Theakston was the proposition that the figures in
question, while not politicians, were role models of a sort and that it is
important for the public not to be misled about such people. This notion,
while it appears in the Press Complaints Commission Code to which the
courts must have regard,I"3 is one which surely must be approached with
caution in principle, and was in any event pressed into action in these cases
in a way that was thoroughly muddled. In A v B, the court laid down the
general guideline that:
"[A] public figure may hold a position where higher standards
of conduct can be rightly expected by the public. [He] may be
a role model whose conduct could well be emulated by others.
He may set the fashion."'54
Applying this to the facts before it, Lord Woolf CJ found:
148 n 2 above, at 552.
149 Phillipson, n 114 above.
150 See eg Lion Laboratories [1985] QB 526, at 537; Francome [1984] 1 WLR 892,
at 898; LRT v Major of London [2003] EMIR 40.
151 M. Tugendhat QC and I. Christie, The Law of Privacy and the Media (Oxford
University Press, 2002), at 420-21.
152 Here the authors cite N v Portugal, app no. 20683/92 (1995) and Tammer v
Estonia, (2003) 37 EHRR 43.
Under s 12 HRA.
'54 n 2 above, at para lI(xiii).
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".... it is not self-evident that how a well-known premiership
football player [Gary Flitcroft] chooses to spend his time off
the football field does not have a modicum of public interest.
Footballers are role models for young people and undesirable
behaviour on their part can set an unfortunate example.""15
It is interesting to compare this passage with the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in NIB v RTE in addressing the issue of the public interest defence; it
vividly illustrates how far the English courts have taken the defence of public
interest from the notion of protecting the public from serious harm.
Ironically, perhaps, in this case an old-fashioned "no-confidence-in-iniquity"
defence could have been used, since adultery is certainly "immoral" in the
traditional sense. But instead, as seen above, the judge focused upon the
supposed benefit to the public in knowing the information concerned. In
particular, the Court of Appeal judgment in A v B suggests that the interests
of young men, who may be influenced by footballers, in being informed of
the true state of their sexual behaviour, outweighs the right not to have
intimate details of one's sexual life publicised to the world at large. The
contrast with NIB v RTE, in which the Supreme Court agonised over how far
the revelation of widespread, criminal tax evasion was in the public interest,
could not be stronger. The Court of Appeal moreover seems somewhat
confused as to what benefit the young men supposedly influenced by the
behaviour of Gary Flitcroft would receive from having immoral behaviour
on his part publicised. The reference to the fact that such behaviour may "set
an unfortunate example" indeed suggests that they may be harmed by finding
out such matters. Yet this was somehow seen as a sufficiently weighty
public interest to outweigh what, in Strasbourg terms, was undoubtedly a
serious invasion of private life.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, then, whilst the Irish courts are only very slowly and
tentatively expanding the boundaries of the public interest defence beyond
the revelation of serious wrong-doing, the English courts, in one case at least,
have stretched it to include the public's desire to receive gossip that may
affect their opinion of the sexual continence of premiership footballers. By
so doing, English judges are allowing Article 10 to cast a protective mantle
around speech that holds up the personal life of celebrities for public
entertainment, and in so doing assaults human dignity, personal autonomy,
and what Strasbourg'56 has referred to as the value in the "development,
without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his
relations with other human beings."' 57 The latter value has, indeed, been
frequently recognised by the Strasbourg Court as one underlying the right of
free expression;" it is ironic therefore to see Article 10, intended in part to
enhance the self-development of the individual, being pressed into service to
justify speech that assaults and impedes that freedom.
Ibid, at para 45.
' In Botta v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 241.
157 See n 124 above.
158 The ECtHR has repeatedly asserted that freedom of expression is one of the
"essential foundations for the development of everyone" (Otto Preminger
Institute v Austria (1994) EHRR 34, at para 49).
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This paper has argued that the public interest test in the Irish law of
confidence needs to be developed substantially beyond its current state in
order fully to reflect the demands of Article 10, but that the English line of
case law post-HRA on the public interest defence in personal information
cases serves as a clear warning that such development needs to be firmly
grounded in the values underlying freedom of expression itself. Thus the
class of tabloid speech about the sexual lives of celebrities, which has no part
to play in informing public debate on matters of public concern, and which
tends to run counter to the values of human autonomy and human
flourishing, should emphatically not be seen as serving any public interest,
when that notion is configured not merely as judicial intuition as to what is
desirable for society generally, but as one structured by the principles
underpinning the right to free expression itself. If such a course is followed,
Irish courts could not only markedly enhance Irish law's recognition of the
importance of freedom of expression in a democratic society, but also avoid
the abuse of that concept in the service of gutter journalism that degrades
both individuals and our public culture. The Irish courts should enhance
their role as guardians of fundamental rights and the public interest properly
so-called, not become the guardians of the gutter press.
POSTCRIPT
As this article was going to press, the House of Lords decision in Campbell v
MGN [2004] UKHL 22 was handed down. In a lengthy judgment of over 60
pages, their Lordships decided by three to two that the publication of the
details of Naomi Campbell's treatment at Narcotics Anonymous and of
photographs of her leaving a particular meeting with other patients amounted
to a breach of confidence that could not be justified in the public interest
and/or under Article 10 ECHR, thus overturning the Court of Appeal
decision. This judgment, one of the most important in terms of media
freedom since the HRA came into force, is also of tremendous significance
for the area of law with which this article is concerned. In particular, their
Lordships unanimously confirmed that the correct approach to balancing
speech and privacy interests is that outlined by the authors above and used in
Re S (see note 104 above) - that is, the dual use of proportionality: see in
particular the speech of Lord Hoffman at paragraph 55, of Lord Hope at
paragraph 113 and Lady Hale at paragraph 140-141. Their Lordships also
set the most authoritative possible seal on the use of a radically modified
form of breach of confidence to protect privacy: it not only clearly discards
any need for a prior relationship between the parties, but also sets breach of
confidence in a new conceptual framework. As Lord Nicholls summed it up:
"The essence of the tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of private
information" (at paragraph 41). Finally, the speech of Lady Hale in
particular showed a clear recognition of the need, expressed above in this
article, to approach the public interest test by reference to the values
underpinning Article 10 ECHR and in particular the notion that different
categories of speech have different levels of importance under that Article
(see paragraph 148) with reportage of celebrity gossip coming low down in
the scale. As her Ladyship put it, "The political and social life of the
community, and the intellectual, artistic or personal development of
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individuals, are not obviously assisted by pouring over the intimate details of
a fashion model's private life." (at paragraph 149; see also the speech of Lord
Hope, at paragraph 117). Thus the judgment also appears likely to inhibit
future judicial acceptance of the kind of flimsy public interest arguments that
this article has criticized.
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